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HE New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has
been widely lauded as a new, and more importantly an autochtho-
nous, African strategy for the rejuvenation of the ailing African
landscape.1 The major objectives of NEPAD 2 encompass almost all
spheres of continental integration with a view toward creating a new eco-
nomic landscape.
This article provides an analytical discussion of the NEPAD strategy
and its role in economic integration and regulation in Africa. It under-
takes a critical overview of the agreement, focusing mainly on the aspects
of economic growth and integration of the member states. The primary
question posed is whether NEPAD can be a useful tool for the economic
integration and sustained growth of Africa. If so, what are its powers, if
any, to ensure compliance and to monitor growth? 3
The first part of this article addresses NEPAD's place as an instrument
of international law. This includes a discussion of the use of international
law instruments and international organizations as tools for the surveil-
lance of uniform economic growth among member states.
The NEPAD strategy sets out initiatives, which are directed toward re-
juvenating the economies of African states.
The second part of this article focuses on economic governance and
related initiatives. Drawing on earlier initiatives within the African conti-
nent and elsewhere, an argument may be presented that while the
NEPAD strategy succeeds at redirecting attention to the African conti-
* Centre for Commercial Legal Studies, Queen Mary & Westfield College, Univer-
sity of London. Supervisor: Dr. Heba Shams.
1. See, e.g., Heads of State and Government of the eight major industrialized coun-
tries and representatives of the European Union, Statements at the G8 Africa Ac-
tion Plan, Kananaskis Summit, Canada (June 26-27, 2002).
2. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Oct. 2001, available at http:/
/www.uneca.org/eca resources/ConferenceReports-andOtherDocuments/
nepad/NEPAD.htm [hereinafter NEPAD].
3. This includes queries into what measures may be employed to achieve the stipu-
lated economic growth without alienating the political regimes given the peculiar
sensitivity of African political regimes to any perceived loss of sovereignty.
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nent, it does not address underlying issues that have led to and perpetu-
ate the current endemic problems within the continent.
It is trite to say that for any international framework such as NEPAD
to be effective, a certain measure of accountability and measurability of
its objectives is required. This presumes the parties subscribe to certain
fundamental principles, namely an overall consciousness and respect of
international principles. The article briefly addresses the implementation
strategies required for integrated economic growth including the role of
the African Union; the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); and
other tools for economic supervision, surveillance, and integration.
It is argued that while the NEPAD strategy presently succeeds in redi-
recting attention to the need for African economic rejuvenation and inte-
gration, it fails to provide a framework for the effective translation of
such attention into lasting action. It is argued that the goals of the
NEPAD strategy can only be achieved if it is substantially modified; in-
corporated; and implemented by existing regional, sub-regional, and na-
tional frameworks. It is further suggested that the experience of previous
and ongoing efforts at regional economic integration and regulation
points to the need for a new commitment to the implementation of the
proposed strategies.
II. THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT
A. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The stated primary objectives of NEPAD are articulated in the pream-
ble of the NEPAD document and in the long-term objectives.4 These
objectives include the eradication of poverty in Africa, the placement of
African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path toward
sustainable growth and development, the halting of the marginalization
of Africa in the globalization process, and the promotion of the role of
women in all activities. Article 68 sets out the following interim goals to
be achieved by 2015:
(1) to achieve and sustain an average GDP rate of above 7 percent
per anum for the next fifteen years; and
(2) to ensure that the continent achieves the agreed upon UN Mil-
lennium International Development Goals (IDGs).5
NEPAD focuses on the creation of conditions conducive to investment,
growth, and development through the overhaul of present economic con-
ditions and the institution of programs for accelerated development. It is
premised on African states, and in particular their leaders, making com-
mitments to economic growth, good governance, democracy, human
rights, and the peaceful resolution of conflict and instability within the
continent. NEPAD postulates that action must be undertaken in several
critical sectors in order to achieve the objectives of African economic de-
4. NEPAD, supra note 2, 67.
5. See G.A. Res. 5512, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A156/326 (2000).
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velopment. These critical sectors include infrastructure, education,
health, agriculture, and information and communications technology.
In order to finance the development of these sectors, resources must be
mobilized both within and outside the continent by different means in-
cluding increased domestic savings, capital inflows, debt relief, increased
targeted Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) flows, and private
capital. There is also an emphasis on better management of public reve-
nue and expenditure.
B. THE HISTORY AND FORMATION OF THE NEPAD
The NEPAD is a consolidation of two main papers, namely the Millen-
nium Partnership for the African Recovery Program (MAP) and the
Omega Plan for Action (Omega Plan). 6
The MAP was developed primarily by Heads of State and Government
from South Africa, Algeria, and Nigeria. They proposed a plan for sus-
tainable development based on the implementation of strategic initiatives
in four key areas: maintenance of peace, security and governance; diversi-
fication of Africa's production and exports; investment in infrastructure;
and development of financial mechanisms. After extensive lobbying and
debate, the MAP was revised a number of times to its final version, MAP
draft 3b.
Concurrent with the development of the MAP, the Omega Plan was
developed by President A. Wade of Senegal and first presented at the
Franco-Africa Summit in Yaound6, Cameroon in January 2001. It postu-
lated that given Africa's difficulties, a new strategic vision based on a
comprehensive and realistic program was vital for Africa's recovery. It
detailed strategies for needs assessment, financing, and action in given
priority sectors. These sectors were identified as basic infrastructures, ed-
ucation, health, and agriculture. 7 It established a target for the alleviation
of poverty of a mean annual growth rate exceeding 7 percent.8 A unique
feature of the Omega Plan was its institutionalization through the crea-
tion of a board of directors comprising debtor and creditor representa-
tives. 9 The MAP draft 3b and the Omega Plan were subsequently
consolidated and presented under the title "A New African Initiative:
Merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program
6. Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery (Map 3A and Map Draft 3B)
(DATE); Omega Plan (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.nepad.org.ng; Constitu-
tive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 (May 26, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.africa-union.org [hereinafter African Union]; Treaty of the
African Economic Community, June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241, available at http://
www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key-oau/aectreatl.htm.
7. Omega Plan, supra note 6, 1 29.
8. Id. 91 19. This plan primarily targeted economic growth and development. It ar-
gued strenuously for development within the five sub-regions under the OAU,
UNECA, and the ADB.
9. This corporate style board was to include a representative from each of the Afri-
can sub-regions as stipulated under the OAU Charter as well as representatives of
the IMF, World Bank, European Union, Japan, the United States, and Canada.
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and the Omega Plan for Action (NAI)". The NAI was adopted at the
OAU/AU Summit of the Heads of State and Government in Lusaka,
Zambia, and was subsequently renamed the New Partnership for Africa's
Development.10
C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEPAD
The NEPAD operates within a three tier governing structure as
follows:
(1) The Heads of State and Government Implementation Commit-
tee (HSGIC) is comprised of twenty states, which meet three
times per year.11 Its mandate includes implementing the
NEPAD and developing a strategic plan for marketing and
communicating its objectives at the national, sub-regional, con-
tinental, and international levels. The Lusaka Summit desig-
nated NEPAD as a project of the OAU/AU and created
procedures to reinforce this relationship.12 These include en-
suring that the Implementation Committee reports annually to
the AU Assembly, 13 the AU Chair and Secretary General are
ex-officio members of the Implementation Committee, and the
AU Secretariat participates at Steering Committee meetings;
(2) The Program of Action Steering Committee is comprised of the
personal representatives of the five initiating Presidents. Its
mandate is to develop Terms of Reference for identified pro-
grams and projects as well as overseeing the Secretariat; and
(3) The Secretariat is the operational arm of NEPAD. It comprises
a small, full-time core staff based in South Africa. It has several
functions including liaison and coordination as well as adminis-
trative and logistical outsourcing of work on technical detail to
lead agencies or consultants.
10. Declaration on the New African Initiative, July 4, 2001, AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVII),
available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Heads%20of%20state
%20Summits/Hog/HogAssembly200l.pdf [hereinafter AHG/Decl. 1]; Communi-
qug of the Meeting of the Implementation Committee of the Heads of State and
Government of the NEPAD (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.uneca.org/
nepad/Communique/htm.
11. These include the five initiating states, including South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria,
Senegal, and Egypt. The other fifteen states are drawn from the five regions of
Africa including North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and
Southern Africa.
12. AHG/Decl. 1, supra note 10, at 27-30, paras. 9-10. Prior to this, the OAU/AU
featured in the NEPAD only as a resource organization to support NEPAD in the
implementation of its initiatives. See NEPAD, supra note 2, art. 201. Likewise the
Constitutive Act of the AU does not mention NEPAD. A perusal of the MAP and
Omega suggest that the intention of the parties was to create a separate plan for
the fast track development of member states under a program outside of the OAU/
AU structure. See, e.g., MAP, supra note 6, art. 104; Omega Plan, supra note 6, ch.
V.
13. It is not clear what if any, effective control the AU Assembly exercises over
NEPAD. Given the challenge of decision-making within the AU, which requires
consensus or consent by two-thirds of the membership, the subservience of
NEPAD thereto may hinder swift decision making required for the implementa-
tion of NEPAD initiatives.
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In addition to the structures identified above, a number of Task Teams
were established. The purpose of these teams was to develop specific,
detailed, and practical projects and programs-in conjunction with the
agencies identified as lead agencies-for the subsequent HSGIC meet-
ings to consider in the priority areas identified. These projects include
capacity building on peace and security; agriculture and market access
with the OAU/AU; economic and corporate governance with UNECA;
and infrastructure, central bank regulation, and the creation of financial
standards with the ADB.1 4 A Sub-Committee on peace and security
headed by the South African President was established for addressing
conflict prevention, management, and resolution issues.15
The leaders also agreed to establish parameters for good political and
economic governance and to consider an appropriate mechanism for peer
review. This, as we shall see later, is a key feature of the NEPAD
strategy.
D. THE NEPAD INITIATIVES
The NEPAD can be broadly separated into two distinct parts. In the
preamble, the history and present status of Africa's economy is analyzed.
The authors attempt a critical analysis of the issues that have contributed
to the underdevelopment of Africa. It also points to the need for any
initiative seeking to reverse Africa's underdevelopment to be African ini-
tiated, led, and controlled. In the second substantive part, various initia-
tives are set out for the realization of the goal of African economic
integration and development. These are categorized into various initia-
tives and key themes as follows: (1) Peace and Security Initiative; (2) De-
mocracy and Political Governance Initiative; (3) Economic and
Corporate Governance Initiative; (4) Sub-regional and Regional Ap-
proaches to Development; (5) Human Resource Development Initiative;
(6) Environment Initiative; (7) Capital Flows Initiative; and (8) Market
Access Initiative.
Each initiative includes a statement of objectives and a plan of action.
They are interspersed with statements of priority and methods of achiev-
ing the stated objectives. Thus, for example, under the human resource
development initiative, NEPAD lists poverty reduction, the education
gap, the brain drain, and health as primary areas. These initiatives mark
the critical areas identified by the authors of the document as being vital
to the development of Africa's economies. The economic initiatives are
discussed later in chapter 3.
14. From a perusal of the purposes of the task forces, the NEPAD strategy appears
more as a co-ordinator of already existing programs under various bodies, rather
than a new initiative. The value added by such co-ordination, if any, is questioned.
15. Cf., CHARTER OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY art. 111(f), VIII(a), 479
U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter CHARTER]. Articles 111(f) and VIII(a) adopted the Con-
ference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation In Africa (CSS-
DCA). Additionally, the subsequent creation of the CSSDCA unit implemented
the objectives of promoting peace, security and good governance in Africa.
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It is imperative however at this stage to address the status of NEPAD
as an instrument of international law capable of generating compliance
and implementation. The attainment of NEPAD's objectives is inextrica-
bly bound to its qualitative nature as a binding instrument. In order to
determine the latter, one must peruse the document's position as an in-
strument of international law.
E. THE NEPAD AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The NEPAD strategy moves away from the traditional hard law16 binds
of treaties encapsulated in the RECs and other economic initiatives, to-
wards a soft law mechanism. An examination of the reasons behind this
shift, which reflects current legal thinking on the best mode of articulat-
ing international economic law instruments, reveals that the purpose
thereof is not conventional and itself leads to the question of implementa-
tion and enforceability of the NEPAD.
Nations approach international economic relations in what may appear
to be a contradictory fashion. While affirming their desire to confront
economic challenges collectively, they simultaneously limit their obliga-
tions to take remedial action by retaining discretion over the scope of
such duties and avoiding legally binding norms.1 7 Proponents of eco-
nomic soft law instruments argue that such instruments create a regula-
tory framework while retaining the necessary flexibility to allow countries
to manoeuvre or manipulate their local circumstances to achieve these
goals. 18 These instruments of political expression articulate urgent mat-
ters in an acceptable form for all signatories with the expectation that
they will lead to economic activities. 19
Scholars generally classify soft law instruments into three broad catego-
ries. R. R. Baxter lists these categories as:
(1) International agreements, which state only generalized and
non-specific hopes and wishes for the continuing relationships
among the parties. These agreements are characterized by
vague language and a failure to set specific goals. Signatories
are aware that these agreements stand only rebus sic stantibus.
If any circumstances change, there is no obligation to fulfil the
terms of the agreements. These agreements survive largely by
the perception of signatory states concerning mutual advan-
16. For a comparative discussion on the distinctions between hard law and soft law, see
R. R. Baxter, International Law in Her "Infinite Variety, " 29 I. C. L. Q. 549, (1980);
Arnold D. McNair, The Functions and Differing Character of Treaties, 11 B. Y. B.
1. L. 100, (1930).
17. Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law," 30 Mc-
GILL L. J. 37, 40-42 (1984).
18. Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 I. C. L. Q. 850, 866 (1989).
19. Such instruments or declarations may lead to the subsequent adoption of hard law
instruments as the Establishment of a New Economic Order and the subsequent
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which arose there from or re-
main as hortatory statements.
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tages derived there from, political expediency, or economic re-
ward. They are subjective and dependent wholly on goodwill
rather than on enforceability. 20
(2) International agreements that include statements intending to
bind parties to specific obligations expressed within a non-bind-
ing framework. Examples of such agreements include the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(Treaty of Rome),21 which adopts certain regulations and direc-
tives for immediate implementation,2 2 as well as exhortations to
create new institutions or further research and drafting of
agreements. These are the so called pactum de contrahendo.
(3) Hortatory provisions are those that carry no legal sanction but
are rich in intent and content of the parties. These provisions in
an agreement are more than empty expressions of desired rela-
tions, but rather create expectations of nations to undertake
certain activities. However, the lack of enforcement mecha-
nisms, whether institutional or ad hoc, reduces these provisions
to the status of hortatory provisions. 23
Most arguments against the use of treaties to determine state obliga-
tions rest on the premise that states themselves will shy away from being
bound to specific, enforceable legal norms. It is perceived that the pre-
ferred instrument for the articulation of international economic norms is
soft law agreements. 24 The creation of NEPAD as soft law appears in
line with this rationale. It is not clear whether a hard law instrument
would perforce generate compliance within the African states. The
Treaty for African Economic Community (AEC Treaty) for example,
provided very specific and ambitious plans, which were not fulfilled
within the given period. In a bid to avoid this pitfall, the NEPAD strat-
egy was drafted as a broad based generalized agreement. 25
This argument raises a number of issues. The first is the question of the
efficacy of NEPAD in the face of the limited success of existing hard law
instruments such as the Treaty establishing the AEC and the various Re-
gional Economic Communities and arrangements. 26 The simple creation
20. These have been referred to as political treaties. See McNair, supra note 16, at
100; AusT, LAW OF TREATIES 501-02, 13 (1961). These include such instruments as
the Atlantic Charter or the Yalta Agreement, which clearly do not create any legal
obligations for the signatories.
21. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 17, available at http://www.hri.org/
docs/Rome57/.
22. Id. arts. 85-86. Examples include articles 85 and 86 dealing with rules on competi-
tion in the European common market.
23. See Baxter, supra note 16, at 552-556. The characterization of the above agree-
ments should not in any way be seen to undermine the far reaching non-legal ef-
fects of enforcement of soft law instruments. The above merely provides a
guideline for the perusal of the NEPAD strategy and for its provisions.
24. See generally, Chinkin, supra note 18, at 854; Baxter, supra note 16, at 556.
25. See, e.g., Ravi Kanbur, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD):
an Initial Commentary, Cornell University, available at http://www.people.cornell.
edu/poverty/Kanbur/POVNEPAD.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
26. See chapter two of this article for an outline of the existing RECs and their role in
economic integration.
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of a soft law instrument without addressing the issue of the endemic non-
compliance with earlier initiatives raises the contention that the purpose
of the earlier treaties may be seen not as frameworks for action, but
rather as political statements to which parties do not intend to adhere or
to be bound. If so, then the implementation of the NEPAD and compli-
ance thereto may be questioned.
Second, the recent history of African economic development is littered
with numerous initiatives similar to the NEPAD strategy. However,
these have been slow to fulfil their mandates within the continent. The
failure by the proponents of NEPAD to critically analyze and redress the
factors that led to the failure of these initiatives may lead to the recur-
rence of these factors to the detriment of NEPAD. 27 The success of
NEPAD hinges strongly on its avoidance of the pitfalls of earlier strate-
gies in addition to the incorporation of its objectives into the regional
communities and exiting efforts at integration.
III. INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
The traditional concept of the nation state as an independent, autono-
mous entity has been eroded in the past twenty years with globalization
and its attendant effects on the domestic and international trading sys-
tems.28 Technological advances, complex cross-border private interac-
tions by enterprises, and increased interdependence of markets have
created new opportunities and challenges for national entities.29 Nations
adapt to these new economic challenges through the strategic devolution
of some existing powers in order to preserve their territorial integrity and
national sovereignty from the threat of possible implosion.30 In recent
27. Cf. United Nations Program of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Devel-
opment, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 77th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/151 (1991);
United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/334 (1993) (both of which bear strong similari-
ties to the NEPAD in scope, intention and goals, but were not successful for rea-
sons including the duplication of activities at the continental and regional levels).
28. For example, the demise of communism, the development of market economies
replacing state controlled markets, the advent of globalization, and the increased
interdependence of nations through trade in goods and services have led to the
increased focus on international trade and external markets.
29. Such challenges are not peculiar to developing or emerging economies. Increased
efficiency in communications has affected labour markets in developed countries
by enhancing access to cheaper service provision in developing countries. Con-
versely the removal of barriers to trade and investment has opened hitherto closed
economies to the challenges of foreign enterprises. See generally KENICHI OHMAE,
THE END OF THE NATION-STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMICS 7 (Harper
Collins 1995); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OF NoT: THE MANIC
LoGic OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 11 (Penguin Books 1998).
30. An example of this adaptation is the voluntary cessation of certain powers to a
supra-national entity as exemplified by the European Union and the creation of
regional bodies to enhance trade and commerce within regions. Nations unable to
manage the internal and external pressures have in extreme cases collapsed and
continue to exist only by territorial definition, for example, Somalia. See, e.g.,
RUMU SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 13-32
(Kluwer Law International, 2d ed. 2002).
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years, this has led to the revival of regional economic bodies and regula-
tion of international activity. This, in turn, has brought to focus the role
of international economic law.
International economic law covers a very broad range of matters. 31 It
has been divided broadly into transactional and regulatory categories.
Transactional international economic law relates primarily to transactions
by private parties and focuses on informing and aiding trans-national eco-
nomic activity by private actors. 32 Regulatory international economic law
emphasizes the role of government and public bodies in creating and ena-
bling an environment for transactions, the regulation of such transactions,
and the engagement with other public bodies and governments in harmo-
nization of rules of engagement in international transactions. It therefore
acts as a basis on which transactional international economic activities
may proceed. 33 The latter form of international economic law is the focus
of the NEPAD, and is largely in response to increased regional integra-
tion and the prevalence of global and regional economic communities.
A. REGIONAL INTEGRATION WITHIN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT
There are two main schools of thought with regard to integration. The
first is the federalist school. This is a politically oriented theory that pro-
motes the adoption of common constitutions, the creation of joint institu-
tions of local or central government. The second is the functionalist
school, which places emphasis on the predominance of economies over
politics and advocates gradual economic integration, which may lead to
political integration through request by and predominantly for the benefit
of economic powers. 34
Economic integration strictu sensu relates to the production, distribu-
tion, consumption, and the facilitation of economic activity across bor-
ders. Economic integration may vary between free trade areas, customs
unions, common markets, and economic union to total economic integra-
tion.35 Developing countries have pursued economic integration for the
primary purposes of economic growth and development, the pooling of
31. These may range from the private international economic transactions including
trade, financial services and the attendant issues of property, accruing party rights
and obligations, to government regulation of financial and economic matters, and
related dispute settlement. See generally John J. Jackson, Global Economics and
International Economic Law, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, (1998).
32. Some writers emphasize the dominance of the transactional aspect of international
economic law as the proper domain of international law. See, e.g., RONALD H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 119-85 (University of Chicago
Press 1988); C.A.E. Goodhart, Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traf-
fic?, 60 MODERN L.R. 1, 1-7 (1997).
33. See, e.g., JOHN J. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND THE WTO
10-16 (Cambridge University Press 2000).
34. See generally AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Domenico Mazzeo ed., Cam-
bridge University Press 1984).
35. See, e.g., BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2-4 (Green-
wood Press 1961).
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common resources, increased economies of scale and scope, and ease of
cross-border mobility including technology and access to markets.
Integration in Africa can be traced to the prevalence of colonial admin-
istration of protectorates or spheres of influence through common admin-
istrative bodies, laws, finance, and currency among other areas. 36 After
decolonization, integration was pursued largely for federalist purposes
and later, with increasing desire for economic growth and development.37
B. EFFORTS TOWARD CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
The African economic landscape has a plethora of overlapping regional
economic communities. On a continental basis, there have been two
main participants, namely the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (UNECA) and the African Union, which was formerly known as
the Organization for African Unity (OAU).
UNCEA's mandate is to support the economic and social development
of African states, foster regional integration, encourage beneficial ex-
ploitation of natural resources, and promote international cooperation
for Africa's development.3 8 In 1963, the OAU was formed as a supra-
national African body to foster cooperation and some form of federal
integration. Its mandate was to promote unity and to coordinate African
economic, diplomatic, defence, education, and health policies.3 9 Integra-
tion was to be pursued at regional levels through five main Regional Eco-
nomic Communities (RECs) set within geographical proximity. The
OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU) through the adoption of
the Constitutive Act of the African Union dated July 2001.40 However,
the concept of economic development through the RECs was maintained
within the AU.
C. REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES
Regional cooperation received favour because it was viewed as most
competent to address problems specific to the different regions. Through
the RECs, regions could pursue such trade, industrial, and economic
growth as best suited their situations. In turn, this would enhance conti-
36. For example, British East African colonies shared a single currency and had ser-
vice sharing arrangements; Central African territories permitted the free move-
ment of factors of production within their boundaries as did the British West
Africa. For a more detailed discussion on the colonial administrative integration
within Africa, see Satish C. Mehta, African Unification: Past Experience and Future
Promise, 41 AFRICA Q. 89 (2001). Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Delhi at
page 90.
37. These range from the OAU to the regional economic communities the latter of
which have continued largely on the basis of historical, geographical and political
lines but motivated by enhancement of intra-regional trade such as the member-
ship of ECOWAS and the EAC.
38. Established in 1958 as a UN body for regional growth in Africa.
39. CHARTER, supra note 15, art. II, §§ 1-2.
40. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted by the 36th Ordinary Ses-
sion of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government July 10-12, 2001, in
Lome, Togo.
AFRICAN ECONOMIC REGULATION
nental growth thus achieving the objectives set out by the OAU. 41
There are currently fourteen RECs within Africa, seven of which are
considered larger communities with the other seven serving as subsets of
these larger ones. The seven major RECs include: (1) AMU - Arab
Maghreb Union (five members); (2) COMESA - Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (twenty members); (3) ECCAS - Economic
Community of Central African States (ten members); (4) ECOWAS -
Economic Community of West Africa States (fifteen members); (5) CEN-
SAD - Community of Sahel-Saharan States (eighteen members); (6)
IGAD - Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (seven mem-
bers); and (7) SADC - Southern African Development Community
(fourteen members).
The other seven are largely sub-regional communities within the above
seven RECs, including: (1) CEMAC - Central African Economic and
Monetary Community with six members all belonging to ECCAS; (2)
CEPGL - Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries with
three members also belonging to the ECCAS; (3) EAC - East African
Community with three members, two belonging to COMESA and one to
SADC; (4) IOC - Indian Ocean Commission with five members, four
belonging to COMESA and one to SADC; (5) MRU - Mano River
Union with three members belonging to ECOWAS; (6) SACU - South-
ern African Customs Union with seven members, five belonging to
SADC and two to COMESA; and (7) UEMOA - Western African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union with. eight members all belonging to
ECOWAS.
Of the fifty-three African countries, seven are members of one REC,
twenty-seven are members of two RECs, eighteen are members of three
RECs, and one is a member of four RECs. 42
The duplication of objectives and activities of the RECs became clear
as member states pursued activities within overlapping regions. 43 In rec-
ognition of the overlap, the treaty establishing the African Economic
Community (AEC) set out an objective of rationalizing and harmonizing
the RECs to attain the objectives of economic growth."
41. AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 34, at 7.
42. Information obtained from the UNECA, Annual Report on Integration in Africa
2002 Overview, Addis Ababa, Economic Commission for Africa, a full report may
be obtained from the UNECA website, at www.uneca.org (last visited Aug. 31,
2004).
43. The Treaty Establishing the East Africa Community, Nov. 30, 1999, art. 5, §§ 1 - 2,
states that the Partner States undertake to establish a customs union, a common
market and subsequently a monetary union with the ultimate objective of a politi-
cal federation. Two of the signatories to the EAC are also in the COMESA, while
one is a member of the SADC. Both treaties have similar objectives to that of the
EAC. Cf. COMESA Treaty, [DATE], art. 4, §§ 1, 4, available at www.comesa.int/
about/treaty/view; Southern African Development Community Declaration and
Treaty (SADC), Aug. 17, 1992, art. 5, §§ l(d)-f, available at www.sadc.int/index.
php?action=A1001&page-id=declaration-and_treatyof__sadc.
44. Treaty Establishing the AEC, supra note 6, ch. IV.
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While the objective of economic development has now become the fo-
cus within African RECs, the influences of both functionalist and federal-
ist integration theories is apparent within the NEPAD.
D. THE NEPAD AND THE AFRICAN UNION
NEPAD has been categorized as a project for the realization of the
AU's goals.45 The objectives of the AU as stipulated in article 3 of its
Constitutive Act include the acceleration of political as well as economic
integration, thus bringing to focus the concurrent prevalence of both fed-
eralist and functionalist integration themes.46 Both the AU and NEPAD
are charged with the articulation of African aspirations for integration
both within the continent and on a global level 47 and the pursuit of eco-
nomic development within the continent.
The AU has the capacity to create specialized technical committees to
undertake any function of the Executive Council. Such functions include
foreign trade, agricultural and agro-forestry production, education, and
health and human resource development. Pursuant to this power, the
AU created specialized technical committees for, among others, mone-
tary and financial affairs, transport, communication and tourism, and ru-
ral economy and agricultural matters. These committees are composed of
ministers or senior officials competent in their respective fields and in-
structed to prepare, submit, and where approved, implement projects
within their particular fields of competence. In addition, the committees
serve to coordinate and harmonize projects and programs of the AU.4 8
A number of observations may be made from the foregoing. First, in-
consistency in reporting structures makes unclear the mandate of the AU
to oversee activities of the NEPAD. It may be argued that these AU
committees composed of government officials would have the power to
censure and oversee the activities of NEPAD. However, the reality may
be that given the political seniority of the NEPAD HSGIC, mandated to
implement the NEPAD objectives, any attempt to regulate the latter's
activities may be met with hostility or simply ignored. This reporting in-
consistency is particularly disturbing given that the heads of state and
government who ratified the AU also established an initiative based on
the very mandate of the AU committees. This may further underscore
the observation that the NEPAD was not originally perceived as a pro-
gram of the AU and was instead viewed as a separate initiative.
Second, this duplication of mandates between the AU and the NEPAD
programs has a number of consequences on both the implementing body
45. AHG/Decl. 1, supra note 10.
46. African Union, supra note 6, art. 3, §§ (c), (d) & (j).
47. See id. art. 3(d); cf. NEPAD, supra note 2, art.152, which mandates the respective
representatives to articulate the common position of the African people and with
the OECD/DAC respectively. It may be assumed from a reading thereof that the
AU delegates its mandate to articulate the latter position to the NEPAD although
there is no clear resolution in support of such assumption.
48. Compare the NEPAD reporting structure to the Assembly above.
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and the participating state. There is wastage of human and economic re-
sources through the creation of separate bodies tasked with pursuing the
same or similar objectives. The resulting effect is the removal of two
main factors of economic development from already weak African econo-
mies namely education and specialized human and financial resources.
Further, implementation of parallel programs within member states is
costly for participating countries both in terms of financial and capacity
resource mobilization. These and other concerns on value added by
NEPAD detract from its objective as an initiative to redress the ailing
African economic health.4 9
IV. ECONOMIC INITIATIVES OF THE NEPAD
While the eight core NEPAD initiatives 50 borrow heavily from earlier
strategic plans for Africa, they also introduce a number of issues on Afri-
can economic development. These include domestic resource mobiliza-
tion and capital flows in Africa as well as a number of points on the
search for markets. However, the NEPAD strategy does not appear to
address either the causes of the failures of earlier programs with a view to
avoiding the same pitfalls or the need to bring to the forefront much
needed novelty in tackling the issues raised or the broader concerns of
economic growth and integration in Africa. A short discussion follows
concentrating on the three core initiatives of economic and corporate
governance, market access, and capital flows initiatives.
A. ECONOMIC AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE
The economic and corporate governance initiative51 seeks to promote a
set of concrete and time bound programs aimed at enhancing economic
and public financial management as well as corporate governance. The
steps to achieve this include: (1) a review of economic and corporate gov-
ernance practices in various countries and regions with recommendations
on appropriate standards and codes of good practice for implementation
by African states; and (2) the development by member countries of a
program for improving public financial management and targets, with self
assessment mechanisms.
The initiative looks to regional and sub-regional economic groups for
the activation of economic growth through pooling of resources and in-
49. NEPAD argues that while the issues affecting Africa have continued to persist, its
contribution is the creation of a novel and innovative approach to tackling the
same. However, the novelty of the NEPAD approach has been questioned by a
cross-section of African scholars, politicians, and others. See, e.g., Henning Melber
et al., The NEPAD -African Perspectives 14-22 (2002); Ronald Hope Kempe,
From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of the NEPAD, 101
AFRICAN AFF. 387 (2002); P. Anyang' Nyong'o, Democracy and Political Leader-
ship in Africa in the Context of NEPAD (Aug. 31, 2002), available at http://www.
jiia.or.jp/pdf/conference/020831-nyongo.pdf.
50. NEPAD, supra note 2, 1 86-98.
51. Id. 94.
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tra-regional trade through promotion of common projects, rationaliza-
tion, and harmonization of economic and investment policies and
practices. It identifies five priority areas including infrastructure, human
resources, health, agriculture, and access to the markets of developed
countries for African exports.52
The underlying objectives of NEPAD appear to be to encompass the
promotion of Western-style market economies in Africa.53 Herein rests
one of the main pitfalls of Africa's development theories. Rather than
defining development in relation to Africa, the leadership places it on a
development path, which has so far failed its people by maintaining struc-
tures that support its underdevelopment. By maintaining this inconsis-
tency, the NEPAD drafters failed to recognize two things; first, that
developed countries passed through centuries of development including
social or welfare states to attain their present status; and second, that
developed countries created the legal, regulatory, and other structures
that enabled them to harness the resources available for them to acceler-
ate their particular form of development. 54 The transplantation of eco-
nomic goals and strategies not suitable for the continent has proven
unsuccessful in the past. By reintroducing them, NEPAD drafters make a
spirited but imprudent attempt at 'new' African development with old
unsuccessful means.
The initiative addresses the issue of corporate governance as though it
is neutral. Corporate governance is a reflection of both public policy con-
siderations and private institutional, legal, and commercial relation-
ships.55 The function of corporate governance within an integrated
region is to harmonize corporate practices. This presumes the presence
of a willingness to harmonize laws relating to corporate practices and bus-
iness generally. While there is no single set of international principles,
various bodies have set out guidelines on corporate practices.
Presently, international standard setting is largely undertaken by inter-
national professional or specialized institutions within the developed
economies. 56 It is also noteworthy that there is a high presence of MNCs
within the African economies. These are, for the most part, subject to the
corporate governance rules of their regions of origin or principal places of
business. It is not clear whether the NEPAD foresees the creation of a
separate set of rules for local firms, or the adoption of existing interna-
52. Id. 98.
53. id. 185.
54. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 109-59 (Basic Books
2000).
55. Corporate governance rules guide investors in the particular region of operation
on the banking, securities, accounting structures, relationships and the attendant
risks.
56. See, e. g., The Basle Committee and TOSCO for Capital markets, at www.iosco.org
the IAIS on insurance and the IASC on accounting. The financial stability forum
was formed to oversee, collate and coordinate institutional, corporation and ex-
change of information.
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tional standards. The foregoing suggests that the issues of corporate gov-
ernance are not suited for an initiative such as NEPAD but rather a body
such as the ADB, the African Capacity Building Forum and other re-
gional bodies. Such a body would be best suited to assess and adapt to
the existing corporate realities within Africa and continually address
these over time while coordinating and advising them on the effects of
certain practices on the African economies. 57
NEPAD does not address the endemic problem underlying economic
stagnation in Africa-corruption and economic spoliation. Economic
spoliation has been defined as an illegal act of depredation for private
means by constitutional rulers, public officials, and their close associates
in the private sector.58 The effects of economic spoliation on the African
economy have been devastating. There are vast amounts of capital hid-
den in safe havens in Western Europe and North America that serve to
devastate the local economies. 59 The gaping hole left in the economies
must be buttressed by debt. However, the borrowed funds are then
themselves available for plunder. The result is that funds set aside for
economic growth and development are diverted to loan repayment and
graft. In order to obtain funds, governments look toward increased taxa-
tion and decreased public expenditure, which drives away investments in
services and goods.
The NEPAD addresses public financial management by providing a
program for its improvement, 60 but it does not address the indigenous
elite and the safe haven nations, two primary players in economic spolia-
tion. While the local elite commits the misappropriation, the handling
has often been conducted through the tacit or express assistance of the
international financial community. 61
This strategy does not provide for the prevention of corruption and
economic spoliation nor does it address the repatriation of stolen or ex-
propriated funds. Given the vast sums of money involved and the fact
that the funds are often expropriated with the collusion of government
authorities, this would constitute a logical area to address. The pledge by
57. Issues such as privatization of State Operated Enterprises (SOEs) may be best
addressed by such a body. This may also provide a forum to address these issues
and to engage collectively with the IFIs in the articulation of the salient issues
arising from donor instigated corporate reforms.
58. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, A Submerged Challenge for IFIs: A Prescription of Economic
Spoliation, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS at 72. Please contact the author of
this article for specific publication information.
59. Examples include Mobutu and the systematic robbery of Zaire; Nigeria and the
rule of Abacha where he was alleged to have looted over UK£ 3.4 billion. See*
Ndiva Kofele - Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual &
Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under Interna-
tional Law, in A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A VIABLE AP-
PROACH? 293 - 331 (John B. Attanasio & Joseph J. Norton eds., 2001).
60. NEPAD, supra note 2, 91 61.
61. It is contended that through the provision of safe havens and a reluctance to prose-
cute and repatriate persons and funds, the international community acts as a co-
conspirator in this looting.
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the African heads of state and government to take responsibility, collec-
tively and individually, for the accomplishment of certain goals of
NEPAD provides a unique opportunity for the leaders to pledge their
commitment to the eradication of corrupt practices. While the nature
and significance of this pledge is discussed in chapter four, it is clear that
a statement to this effect would serve as a very powerful expression of the
will of the leaders to address the problem.
In addition to the foregoing, other methods are available to address the
issue of economic spoliation. A declaration that economic spoliation con-
stitutes an international crime and strong recommendations for the adop-
tion of domestic legal and regulatory measures for the prevention or
reduction of corruption would serve as a strong step toward the eradica-
tion of such economic spoliation. The latter could be included in the
APRM.62 The envisaged partnerships with developed countries should
address the issue of the safe havens.63 Economic growth may itself pro-
vide more opportunities for corruption or spoliation as it expands both
the incentives and the opportunities. Privatization, for example, has been
seen as an opportunity for large-scale bribery, suggesting that in the ab-
sence of very stringent regulation, corrupt practices would inevitably per-
sist, thereby negating the efforts placed on development. The economic
and corporate governance initiative thus leaves unaddressed many of the
prominent issues while promoting what appears to be a collage of differ-
ent ideas, which although vital, fall short of providing a holistic approach
to the challenges of African economic growth.
B. THE CAPITAL FLOWS INITIATIVE
NEPAD aims to achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product
(GDP) of more than 7 percent per annum for the next fifteen years. In
order to achieve its goal to reduce the percentage of people living in ex-
treme poverty by one-half, NEPAD estimates that there is a need to fill
an annual resource gap of 12 percent of its GDP or sixty-four billion dol-
lars. It postulates that this can be achieved through a number of activities
resulting from the capital flows initiative. These include: increasing do-
mestic resource mobilization; debt relief; and ODA reforms and encour-
aging private capital to enable Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to
62. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 93 AM. J. INTL. L. 470, (1999); Duane Windsor and Kathleen A.
Getz, Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite
Mixed Motives and Diverse Values, 33 CORNELL INTr. L.J. 731, (2000) (discussing
the use of peer review to uphold anti-corruption measures in the United States).
63. Evidence within the international environmental law regime suggests strongly that
developing nations have the capability to generate the requisite consensus for the
promotion of their concerns into instruments of international law. See generally
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 121-45 (Dinch Shelton,.ed., Oxford University Press
2000).
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achieve the international development goals.64
The above initiative is proposed as a common action plan by all Afri-
can countries that participate in NEPAD. The strong underlying theme
of integration or combined action through the singular negotiation plat-
form, for example, the ODA forum and the Financial Market Integration
task Force, clearly points to a desire to pool together and act in accord.
Once again, the initiative repeats the action plans of earlier development
modules. Two issues that deserve noting are the domestic resource mo-
bilization and the ODA and private capital flows initiatives.
1. Domestic Resource Mobilization and the 'Capital Conundrum'
The Capital Flows initiative addresses public funding and methods to
increase the resources available to governments for public expenditure.
However, it fails to address a number of underlying presumptions.
In particular, the call to increase national savings appears to be incon-
sistent with earlier statements within the NEPAD strategy. The agree-
ment makes reference to the fact that over half of the African populace
live on less than two dollars per day. If so, then any call for savings must
presume either that the call for more savings is superfluous or that there
is an underlying recognition of informal wealth within African societies.
Studies show that in many developing countries, a majority of the
wealth held by so-called poor people is not recognized by the existing
national laws and administrative systems. The effect is that the holders of
such assets are marginalized from the benefits of formal legal and admin-
istrative recognition. Citing examples in the Middle East, North Africa,
and South America, De Soto 65 shows how the majority of the wealth in
these countries is locked out of the formal sector primarily through the
inadequacy of legal and regulatory systems to appreciate the local busi-
ness environment.
The legal systems, largely inherited through colonial importation, are
cumbersome, complex, and relatively expensive. These factors serve as a
hindrance rather than as a facilitator of economic activity. The result is
that it is nearly impossible for the holders of such informal wealth to ob-
tain credit, or to enforce rights under the formal legal systems. This has a
two-fold effect. First, on the individual persons, it increases the cost of
transactions and forces the individual to operate in a dual system, intra-
and extra-legal. Second, the state is deprived of accessing the wealth.
Therefore, the tax base is reduced to that which is held in the formal and
invariably urban quarters. These include urban populations of workers,
formal businesses, and what little capital and property is registered in the
legal infrastructure.
The taxation of these groups is very high to provide service to a very
large, non-contributing population. This situation is exacerbated when
64. Specific goals of the NEPAD initiative are based on the Millennium Development
Goals of the United Nations.
65. DE SoTo, supra note 54, at 168-172.
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the economies of these countries fall into recession. Job losses and falling
production in main areas such as manufacturing, mining, and cash crop
production leave governments with only two options-higher taxation of
a shrinking tax base and external borrowing. Any call to mobilize domes-
tic savings must address the issue of fully recognizing and assimilating
informal wealth66 into the domestic legal structures.
It is not necessary here to 'reinvent the wheel' as there are several fun-
damental pillars for the creation of the requisite environment for recogni-
tion and regulation of informal wealth into the formal sector. These
include, among others: (1) clear and defined property rights (the issue
here is often the recognition of existing property rights as well as the
creation of simple, efficient, and effective processes for the registration of
such rights. In the absence of recognized property rights, development is
often cumbersome, costly and unplanned); (2) a legal and regulatory
framework for the recognition and enforcement of agreements;67 (3) ade-
quate, accessible, and affordable financial infrastructure to support sav-
ings and borrowing by small scale business; (4) clear, reliable, and
comprehensive public records with the concomitant structures to enable
efficient issuing and updating of land titles; (5) regulation of trade
through education, standard setting, artisan unions, legislative recogni-
tion of rights and obligations thereof68 ; and (6) widening the tax base to
include the vast majority of informal property and business related
activities.69
While these are not exhaustive, and are largely domestic, the creation
of such frameworks or structures and standards to which the signatories
of NEPAD may accede would enable the latter's objectives to find
grounding in reality and not remain rhetoric. Unfortunately, NEPAD
capital flows initiative does not address this. By continuing to insist on
enhancing the current modes of national savings and tax collection,
NEPAD further disenfranchises the majority of the target population. It
66. The term informal here is used not to mean illegal wealth such as that obtained
through criminal activity, but rather the capital held outside of existing legal and
regulatory frameworks. Examples may include the largely unregistered housing
and other properties in slum areas.
67. RuMU SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 18 (Kluwer
Law International 1999), argues that strictly Lockean formalisation notions may
should be softened and relax to permit a new Rousseauean social contract based
on the established societal lines. The effect may be that the new face of the devel-
oping world may not culminate in the image of OECD countries but may take on a
different and perhaps more relevant natural and uninhibited persona.
68. See generally id.; DE SOTO, supra note 64; JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECITOR
LAW REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (British Institute of International and
Comparative Law and London Institute of International Banking, Finance and
Development Law 2000); THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY (J. Stiglitz
ed. 1990).
69. For an assessment on the impact of informal trade on national revenue loss, see,
e.g., Sam Katabaazi, The Impact of Informal Cross-Border Trade on Food Security
and Revenue: The Situation Uganda/Kenya Border 2 (1995); SAM K. KALLUNGIA,
IMPACT OF INFORMAL CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AF-
RICA 1 (2001).
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is not practical to suggest that there can be any increase in ODA to the
levels hoped under the NEPAD strategy. Therefore, it is critical that the
mobilization debate be expanded to involve the recognition of the infor-
mal wealth held outside of the existing legal and economic spheres of
African countries.
2. ODA and Private Capital Flows
Traditionally, African countries have relied on ODA for domestic and
regional development. However, it is clear that ODA is in decline. 70 This
decline has been attributed to several causes including large government
deficits in donor countries and the increasing debate on the politics and
benefits of foreign aid. The prevalent use of conditionality-based loans
has not yielded the expected tangible economic development in the recip-
ient countries while the social devastation wreaked by the conditions has
considerably weakened countries. 7' While ODA has its advantages 72 and
its place in the process of development, Africa cannot expect to continue
to rely on ODA for its development, let alone expect an increase thereof.
The development of a charter to govern the conditions for the disburse-
ment of any ODA may serve to articulate a common African response to
ODA conditionality and revise the current trends in ODA disbursement.
Further, the proposed independent assessment mechanism, if accepted by
creditors and debtors alike, may provide a forum for more favourable
and immediate response to issues arising from ODA. However, such a
charter and mechanism, if poorly negotiated, may have the adverse effect
of creating yet another cumbersome assessment mechanism in addition to
the existing ones without a clear benefit. While this avenue may be pur-
sued, it appears more practical to move away from heavy reliance on
ODA to the mobilization of domestic wealth and private capital flows,
particularly FDI.
The NEPAD advocates the increase of private capital flows to Africa
by arguing that these are an essential component of filling the resource
gap. Several proposals to increase capital flows have been suggested in-
cluding revising the perception of Africa as a "high-risk continent"
through the promotion of peace and security; improving governance, in-
frastructure development, poverty reduction, and interim risk mitigation
measures, which include credit guarantee schemes; and strengthening
regulatory and legislative frameworks. Public Private Partnerships
(PPPs) and harmonization of regional financial markets are also ad-
vanced in furtherance of this initiative.
70. Quoting WB reports, SARKAR, supra note 67, points out that ODA has tended to
favor developing regimes of Latin America and East Asia bypassing sub-Saharan
Africa.
71. See generally DAVID DOLLAR & WILLIAM R. EASTERLY, THE SEARCH FOR THE
KEY: AID, INVESTMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA 546-68 (World Bank 1999).
72. SARKAR, supra note 67, at 76-106 (arguing that ODA based conditionality part by
training and policy reform make the use of ODA to support long term
macroeconomic policy, institutional and judicial reforms more viable).
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The potential benefit of increased private capital flows is clear. Such
investments enable importation of new technologies and create access to
export markets. Foreign portfolio investment also imposes some fiscal
discipline by forcing local markets to conform to practices and rules of
international capital markets.73 Where invested for long-term assets or
infrastructure, such funds can act as agents for economic development.
However, it cannot be expected, given the present risk and conditions of
the region, that a heavy influx of long-term funds in the short term will
exist. The majority of capital flows are likely to continue to be specula-
tive and short term as investors continue to reassess risk and return.
The potential benefit of such short-term capital flows has been ques-
tioned following the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s. Some economists
argue that short-term capital flows may increase the vulnerability of
economies and damage fragile financial structures in the event of crises. 74
There is a need to ensure that such potential damage is mitigated or in
some way buttressed.
Regional integration can provide some relief in this area. First, nations
within the region may be able to monitor others' activities. 75 Second,
these nations may have the greatest interest in intervening as the conta-
gion effects are likely to be most virulent in the region of the country
immediately affected. If this system intends to be effective, domestic, na-
tional, legal, and institutional structures must be established with the in-
volvement of governments, central banks, deposit protection funds, and
other public institutions such as pension or social security funds as well as
private institutions. These legal and institutional structures must have
well-defined functions and maintain an unfettered direction towards its
fulfilment. Further, they must be harmonized within the regional frame-
work. As argued later, the APRM can be very effective in this area if
properly deployed.
C. THE MARKET ACCESS INITIATIVE (MAI)
The Market Access Initiative comprises eight components, which in-
clude the diversification of production, mining, manufacturing, tourism,
services, private sector promotion, promotion of African exports, and the
removal of non-tariff barriers.
For each of these, there are action points at the African and interna-
tional level. Once again, this underscores the view of the NEPAD as an
73. According to World Bank reports private capital inflows to developing countries in
the decade 1990 -1999 have comprised increase in FDI from $24.1 billion in 1990,
to $192.0 billion in 1999, against fairly stable equity flows and declining debt thus
underscoring the significance of private capital flows generally and FDI in particu-
lar. 1 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2000 36 (2000), available at
www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2000/index.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
74. Koefele-Kale, supra note 59, at 33.
75. Monitoring could be through surveillance tools such as the African Peer Review
Mechanism. The emergency activation techniques would serve as advance warning
in the event of a likely or foreseeable financial/economic/political crisis.
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instrument for integration. From a review of the action points, there is
little new that has been added in the sphere of actions to achieve the set
goals. The stated components have long been a part of the African
agenda and the points of action generally pursued with limited success to
promote the achievement thereof.
The Lagos Plan of Action highlighted attempts to diversify Africa's ex-
ports from primary goods to secondary or manufactured goods and ser-
vices. 76 However, two decades later, the progress has not been as
envisaged. The inclusion of this objective leads to a query into the meth-
ods perceived by the drafters of NEPAD as capable of overcoming past
failures. The opportunity exists for NEPAD to bring about a new focus on
innovative methods to achieve these goals that, in the end, may prove to
be its greatest strength. Because the NEPAD strategy is non-specific
about many of these actions,77 it is not clear how they will be achieved
and how funding for their operation is to be obtained.
NEPAD places heavy reliance on foreign funding and foreign markets
as a panacea for the challenges to continental development. The weak-
ness with this strategy is two fold. First, the funding may not be forth-
coming. Second, there is a presumption that hitherto protected markets
of developed countries will be opened to African products. Through the
WTO process, Africa can negotiate, as a single block, for concessions en-
abling increased flow into markets of developed countries. If NEPAD
intends to adopt this strategy, it must create specific targets, including the
education and dissemination of information concerning the WTO. Spe-
cial consideration is also warranted with respect to other relevant issues
such as the mobilization of suitable advocates within the delegations to
the WTO negotiations to ensure that African views are not only properly
articulated but are reflected in the final agreement. 78 As an alternative
and even more viable market base, NEPAD should consider the develop-
ment of new markets to the south, an area populated with other develop-
ing countries.
While the foregoing is by no means a comprehensive assessment of
NEPAD's economic and corporate governance and related initiatives, it
highlights some inherent issues that require urgent attention to ensure
NEPAD's effectiveness. In the absence of a resolution of these and other
gaps within NEPAD at the African and international level, NEPAD risks
becoming yet another well-intentioned strategy in the perilous landscape
of African economic development.
76. Indeed this was envisaged in the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Plan, the AEC
Treaty and the OAU. See, e.g., The Lagos Plan of Action, ch. 13, (Apr. 28-29,
1980), available at www.uneca.org/adfiii/riefforts/ref/other2.htm.
77. Examples include the petition to developing countries to assist Africa in carrying
out and developing its research and development capabilities in agriculture, which
do not lay out any specific action plan thereby rendering them ineffectual.
78. Preliminary observations of the ongoing EU-SADC negotiations suggest that
there is a clear advantage of regional negotiations particularly for smaller econo-
mies within the region.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
As noted in chapter one, the distinguishing nature of international soft
law instruments is their non-binding character. This characteristic does
not preclude the potential effect of a soft law instrument in ensuring ad-
herence to the agreed norms therein. A perusal of the African interna-
tional law landscape suggests that soft law instruments have rarely been
enforced. This may be attributed to a number of reasons, particularly
member states' adherence to international law instruments.
A. MEMBER STATES APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
By entering into regional arrangements, states willingly concede to the
subrogation of some level of sovereignty in return for perceived benefits.
In the absence of fraud, coercion, or corruption,79 it may be assumed that
signatory states have an interest in observing its provisions. There are
various issues affecting implementation of international law by African
states.
" First, the agreements, although formulated at the international
arena, are often not translated into the national sphere. Conse-
quently, the state cannot exercise jurisdiction, and the electorate
cannot hold them accountable. This problem of dualism serves,
in part, to keep international law outside the reach of domestic
jurisdictions and also to maintain a clear demarcation between
the individual and the enforcement of any rights or obligations
that may arise thereof. Where the agreements are incorporated
into national law, enforcement can be pursued through judicial or
administrative means, which allow for inter-state complaints, in-
dividual or class action suits.80
• Second, the agreements may not include clear, precise, and un-
ambiguous terms. Where a state is willing to undertake its re-
sponsibility under the international instrument, ambiguity in the
language and intent of the agreements can lead to varying inter-
pretation and inconsistent implementation at national and re-
gional levels.
* Third, issues arise with regard to the determination of the cost/
benefit of adherence. While an international soft law instrument
may appear to be hortatory, the presence of a powerful member
state or the articulation of a clear interest or benefit, which may
accrue not just to the nations, but also that appeals to its leaders,
may influence other member states to comply with the agree-
ment. The diplomatic or moral pressure to comply with the in-
strument, 81 or the economic or other sanctions may be influential
79. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 46-53, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
80. See, e.g., AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS arts. 47-49, 55-57,
21 I.L.M. 58.
81. See Chinkin, supra note 18, at 853-57. It is perhaps this moral pressure that has
been exerted upon the President of Zimbabwe as he was seen as an obstacle to the
AFRICAN ECONOMIC REGULATION
in adherence to such arrangements. South Africa and Nigeria re-
present strong African states that possess some capacity to influ-
ence member states through extensive lobbying for NEPAD.
However, such influence must be coupled with the perception of
a clear benefit of adhering to NEPAD. Such self-interest or ben-
efit is not always apparent in past treaties, strategies, and agree-
ments within Africa. This has led to no or partial adherence to
international instruments.
Because of the foregoing and other considerations, African member
states' adherence to international law has been haphazard and incom-
plete.82 While the causes of partial adherence may be numerous, three
issues are addressed herein. These are sovereignty, institutions for imple-
mentation including the OAU/AU system, and the role of individuals in
the promotion of international instruments and particularly NEPAD.
1. Sovereignty and the NEPAD
The right to economic development 83 requires more than the negative
action of restraint, calling instead for the proactive resolution of claims to
property, the instruments of production and the beneficiaries of re-
sources. This in turn requires attention to the issues of prevailing trade
practices, investment policies, sales and marketing of products, and tech-
nology transfer. Such matters, previously held to be the exclusive domain
of states, are now being resolved in the very public regional, continental,
and global arenas.84 While African states have traditionally held onto the
doctrine of state sovereignty to resist intrusion into domestic economic
affairs,85 the acceptance of NEPAD points to a shift in their adherence to
that doctrine in favour of economic growth.86
By acceding to NEPAD and particularly to the APRM, member states
confirm their submission to a supra-national body for the implementation
promotion of NEPAD within the international community. Ian Taylor, Change in
Africa: NEPAD, Zimbabwe, and Elites, Foreign Policy in Focus, available at http://
www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0204nepad-body.html (Apr. 22, 2002).
82. Shadrack B.O. Gutto, The Rule of Law, Human and Peoples' Rights and Compli-
ance/Non-Compliance with Regional and International Agreements and Standards
by African States, World Summit 2002, available at http://www.worldsummit2002.
org/texts/shadrockgutto2.pdf (Apr. 26-29, 2002).
83. While historically there has been some debate as to the existence of a right to
development and the components of any such right, it is generally agreed in inter-
national spheres that there is a legitimate expectation of peoples to delivery of
some form of development. See, e.g., Declaration on the Right to Development,
U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/41/28 (1986), available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm.
84. While failure of the International Trade Organization to take off together with
other 1940s Bretton Woods institutions could be partly traced to the overwhelming
political considerations that economic matters were strictly within the sphere of
nations, the creation of bodies including the regional COMESA, continental
NAFTA and the global WTO attest to this fundamental shift in political considera-
tions of sovereignty of the state in favour of economic expediency.
85. See, e.g., OAU CHARTER arts. 111(1) & (V); African Union, supra note 6, art. 4(a).
86. See, e.g., Gruchalla-Wesierski, supra note 17, at 70-75.
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and monitoring of NEPAD objectives.87 As earlier stated, the purpose of
soft law is to assuage a nation's desire to undertake collective regulation
in economic transactions while maintaining the freedom to alter their po-
sitions in accordance with prevailing circumstances. There is a level of
agreed performance whether tacit or stated, outside of which parties are
viewed as not conforming to the agreed norms 88 and may attract the
mechanisms for compliance. Nations will accede to such instruments
when they know, or can determine, the parameters of the minimum ac-
ceptable behaviour within the context of that arrangement and the per-
ceived 'costs' of non-adherence. The NEPAD falls within the AU and
provides an indication of the expected standards of compliance as well as
the nature of sanctions, if any, that may accrue from non-compliance.
However, these sanctions are few, subject to consensus, and mainly con-
fined to issues that relate to the efficient functioning of the AU. 89 Similar
ambiguities, such as those highlighted in chapter three relating to the eco-
nomic initiatives, tend to blur the parameters of action under the
NEPAD.
2. The OAU/AU and Enforcement of International Law
Dispute resolution within the African context portrays a clear penchant
for consensus building, political resolutions, and an avoidance of the in-
ternational judicial system. Several reasons are advanced for the latter
point, namely that there is a lack of confidence in the international judi-
cial system, which is viewed as largely based on and reflective of Euro-
pean legal custom and origin. Arguably, there is a distrust of the forum
to deliver unbiased judgments and a concomitant view of the forum as
advancing colonialism or neo-colonialism. 90 However, the relatively lim-
ited use by the African states of their own institutions such as the Com-
mission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 91 and the African
Court of Human Rights92 appears to highlight the African states' prefer-
ence for negotiated political resolution to disputes.
87. The view that state consent to be bound by an international agreement amounts to
an erosion of its sovereignty has been challenged by various authors. See, e.g., Jose
Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 213, (2002) (argu-
ing that by concluding international agreements, states in fact enforce their sover-
eignty and safeguard it against possible erosion by international organizations).
88. This is referred to as the "standard of acceptable compliance." ABRAM CI-AvES &
ANTONIO HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-
NATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 17 (Harvard University Press 1998).
89. See OAU CHARTER art. 23.
90. It is argued that the 1966 ICJ judgment in the South West Africa/Namibia cases
generated great mistrust by African countries of the International Court of Justice.
See D.W. BOWETr, CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL TECHNIQUES IN
THE SErLEMENT OF DISPUTES t1 (1984); I. Shihata, The Attitude of New States
Towards the International Court of Justice, 19 INT. ORG. 203, (1965).
91. See OAU CHARTER art. vii.
92. For an analysis of African regional judicial bodies generally and the African Court
of Human Rights in particular, see Nsongurua J. Udombana, Can the Leopard
Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights, 17 AM. U. INT'L
REV. 1177 (2002).
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The AU promulgates a consensus based dispute settlement mechanism
in its articles, suggesting that mediation and political consensus remains
the most preferred mode of dispute settlement. 93
As a project of the AU, the NEPAD strategy finds itself subject to such
conciliation methods. This method of dispute resolution may not be suit-
able for obtaining the speedy resolution of conflicts, particularly where
the party in violation may be entitled to vote on any action or sanctions
that may result upon its breach. The GAT system clearly showed that
such a provision hampers the development of jurisprudence or the effec-
tive conclusion of disputes.94 The AU/NEPAD may consider that given
the experiences of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism, con-
sensus may not ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of
any proposed schemes under the AU or NEPAD. In fact, it may serve as
an active hindrance to the process of the peer review mechanism.
3. The Role of the Individual in the NEPAD
While persons are usually the subject of international law, they are not
traditionally regarded as capable of serving as parties to such instru-
ments. 95 NEPAD departs from this notion by including a statement of
the new political will of the African leaders. The African leaders take
joint responsibility for the achievement of the eight stated targets, includ-
ing the development of appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and
monetary policies, transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for finan-
cial markets, and auditing of private and public sector organizations. By
including such a pledge, NEPAD expands the scope of the obligations,
and perhaps the rights of the parties to international law instruments, to
individuals as well as nations, thus extending the scope of parties under
traditional instruments of international law.
The inclusion of a personal pledge by African leaders is not unique to
the NEPAD strategy.96 However, while such pledges appear to act as a
form of personal undertaking within commercial law, the lack of account-
ability or enforcement poses a challenge in the implementation of any
African economic initiative. They also denigrate the value attributable to
93. For a concise discussion on the preference for ad hoc and consensus based settle-
ment to African disputes, see T. Maulana, Settlement of African States' Disputes, 39
I.C.L.Q. 299-317 (1989).
94. See generally JOHN HOWARD JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND
THF WTO 123 (2000).
95. See Vienna Convention, supra note 79, art. 1; Gruchalla-Wesierski, supra note 17,
at 65.
96. It is however noteworthy that the language of such commitment is 'softer' than
earlier pledges by African leaders. Cf OAU Monrovia Declaration of Commit-
ment of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Guidelines and
Measures for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Economic and Social Devel-
opment for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Monrovia
Declaration), July 17-20, 1979, Res. No. AHG/ST.3(XVI)Rev.1, available at http://
www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity-to-union/pdfs/oau/hog/pHoGAssemblyl979.pdf;
Lagos Plan of Action, supra note 76. The OAU 16th Ordinary Session in Monro-
via, Liberia, held July 1979 is now incorporated into the Lagos Plan of Action,
preamble article 3.
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such 'collective and individual' pledges by African leaders within the con-
text of international instruments, thus suggesting that such pledges do lit-
tle to represent any real commitment to the goals stated therein.
It is not clear when this joint responsibility accrues, or whether it is a
commitment to the present leaders or to all African leaders by virtue of
their leadership position. There is also an appeal to the people of Africa
to support NEPAD, which to be a response to criticism that earlier Afri-
can initiatives failed to include the majority of African people. However,
this call is predicated on the following two issues: that the peoples in
question are aware of and included in the process of NEPAD; and that
there is an established mechanism within individual countries to incorpo-
rate such international instruments into national legislative and adminis-
trative processes. Where countries have a dualistic approach to
international law, such a presumption cannot be made. Given the origi-
nal nature of NEPAD as a program to boost Africa's development, it is
noteworthy that no provisions were made for the rapid absorption of
NEPAD in its entirety into national development plans, legislative and
regulatory spheres, or the administrative processes of the members. Ar-
guably, through the APRM, NEPAD attempts to introduce adherence to
the economic initiatives at national levels.
Because these two issues have not been addressed adequately within
NEPAD, the effectiveness of any supportive action by the African people
as envisioned in NEPAD, including holding governments accountable to
their people, is severely hampered. NEPAD does introduce the APRM,
which has been viewed as a successful aspect of NEPAD and is seen as
the most likely method of ensuring compliance by monitoring the mem-
ber states' implementation.
B. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PEER REVIEW MECHANISM
Peer review has its origins in professional bodies. The medical profes-
sion in particular has long advocated this practice to oversee its members.
Peer review involves two broad areas, namely the evaluation of proposals
and projects by experts, and monitoring state compliance with the provi-
sions of a treaty.97 While the use of the peer review mechanism has not
been widespread, the concept is not new. For example, the African Com-
mission on Human and People's Rights established three independent
special reporters to monitor the implementation of the above Charter
with limited success. NEPAD has formalized this model through the cre-
ation of the APRM.
The APRM is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by Member States
of the AU as an African self-monitoring mechanism. Participation in the
97. For a discussion on the function of peer review mechanisms see, e.g., Effie J. Chan,
The Brave New World of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Review and Scien-
tific Validity, 70 NYU L. REV. 100, 113 (1995); Monica Washington, The Practice of
Peer Review in the International Nuclear Safety Regime, 72 NYU L. REV. 430, 438
(1997).
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process is open to all member states of the AU. Countries wishing to
participate in the APRM notify the Chairman of the NEPAD Heads of
State and Government Implementation Committee. At the point of for-
mally acceding to the peer review process, each State must clearly define
a time-bound Program of Action for implementing the Declaration on
Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance, including
periodic reviews.
There are different types of reviews:
* The first review is a base review that is carried out within eigh-
teen months of a country becoming a member of the APRM
process;
* Then there is a periodic review that takes place every two to four
years;
* A member country can, for its own reasons, ask for a review that
is not part of the periodically mandated reviews; and
* Early signs of impending political or economic crisis in a member
country would also be sufficient cause for instituting a review.
Such a review can be called for by participating Heads of State
and Government in a spirit of helpfulness to the country
concerned.
The base review process entails periodic reviews of the policies and
practices of participating states to ascertain the progress being made to-
wards achieving mutually agreed upon goals and compliance with agreed
political, economic, and corporate governance values, codes, and stan-
dards as outlined in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic,
and Corporate Governance.
The peer review process considers the impact of domestic policies, not
only on internal political stability and economic growth, but also on
neighbouring countries. The stages involved therein include:
* Stage One will involve a study of the political, economic and cor-
porate governance and development environment in the country
to be reviewed, based principally on up-to-date background doc-
umentation prepared by the APRM Secretariat and material pro-
vided by national, sub-regional, regional, and international
institutions.
* Stage Two calls for the Review Team to visit the country con-
cerned where its priority objective will be to carry out the widest
possible range of consultations with the Government, officials,
political parties, parliamentarians, and representatives of civil so-
ciety organizations (including the media, academia, trade unions,
business, and professional bodies).
* Stage Three is the preparation of the Team's report. The report
must be measured against the applicable political, economic, and
corporate governance commitments made as well as the Program
of Action. The Team's draft report is first discussed with the
Government concerned.
• Stage Four begins when the Team's report is submitted to the
participating Heads of State and Government through the
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APRM Secretariat. If the Government of the country in question
shows a demonstrable intent to rectify the identified shortcom-
ings, then it will be incumbent upon participating Governments
to provide what assistance they can, as well as to urge donor gov-
ernments and agencies to come to the assistance of the country
reviewed. If dialogue proves inadequate, the participating Heads
of State and Government may wish to put the Government on
notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate
measures by a given date.98
According to the best information available as of March 30, 2003, ten
African countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding99 during
the sixth HSGIC meeting. These countries include Kenya, Uganda, Alge-
ria, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda,
and South Africa.
The APRM is the strongest tool for the implementation of NEPAD.
Through it, NEPAD HGSIC can ensure compliance with the strategy at
the pain of recommending that donor funding be withheld from the mem-
ber state. This withholding of funds is in addition to the economic sanc-
tions available under the AU mechanism. 100 However, some issues arise
out of the design and the enforceability of the APRM.
By requiring that countries accede to the APRM in addition to their
accession to NEPAD, there is a gap created whereby member states of
the NEPAD may not participate in the APRM. Given the nature of
NEPAD as an initiative for economic development, and the regulation
and integration thereof within the region, this arrangement creates a dual
system whereby the implementation of NEPAD cannot be monitored
across the board, but rather, only among member states. The effect of
such a structure is not clear on the efficacy of NEPAD. However, given
that the signatories to NEPAD far outnumber those to NEPAD itself,
there is a need to increase the membership to the APRM in order to
empower it as a tool for monitoring the development of NEPAD
programs.
The other issue relates to the enforceability of the APRM and corre-
sponds to the earlier argument of the enforceability of NEPAD itself.
Given the requirement for consensus at the AU level and the traditional
reluctance to interfere with what may be considered the internal matters
of a member state, the implementation of the peer review mechanism,
and any sanctions there under, may be limited. Where recommendations
by the APRM team are perceived undesirable or contrary in some form
98. 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
OAU, July 8, 2002, AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex II, available at http:/lwww.
au2002.gov.za/docs/summit-council/aprm.htm(last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
99. Memorandum Of Understanding On The African Peer Review Mechanism, Mar. 9,
2003, available at http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news-upload/NEPAD-
2dCORE_2dDOCUMENTS_2edb.FinaI-MOU-APRM-090303.pdf.
100. It may be argued that the economic sanctions under the AU can only be affected if
a member defaults on payment of contributions to the Union or where it fails to
comply with the decisions of the AU. OAU CHARTER art. 23.
AFRICAN ECONOMIC REGULATION
to the will of the participating country, it would be too easy for that coun-
try to revert to an argument based on sovereignty, and interference
thereof in a bid to avoid addressing the issues raised. 10 1 This loophole
could seriously erode the APRM's potential to act effectively as a regula-
tory mechanism, an area that must be addressed.
While these are only some areas where there may be a challenge to the
APRM, further research may reveal more issues that, if not addressed,
may impede the implementation of the APRM and thwart the intentions
of NEPAD.
The APRM has been initiated only recently with the appointment of its
first panel by NEPAD HSGIC on May 28, 2003.102 This latter body shall
be watched closely as it begins to implement the peer review mechanisms
within the signatory states.
VI. CONCLUSION
NEPAD is:
[A] pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm
and shared conviction that they have a pressing duty to eradicate
poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collec-
tively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the
same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body
politic. 103
NEPAD succeeds in refocusing attention to the issues of development
and regional integration in Africa. However, several critical areas must
be addressed and resolved.
NEPAD must determine its precise nature and relationship to the AU
and to other regional and sub-regional initiatives. This includes harmo-
nizing existing overlaps and creating concise parameters for action and
interaction with other institutions and initiatives. However, NEPAD
must first clarify its specific intent as a program for the implementation of
the AU, and also its endeavour to promote fast-track project develop-
ment in key areas. This clarification should take into consideration the
existing socio-economic and political dimensions of the program. As ar-
gued in chapter three, by highlighting the issues of economic and corpo-
rate governance, capital flows, and market access, NEPAD raises to the
forefront a number of fundamental issues underlying the economic devel-
opment patterns in Africa. These issues include domestic resource mobil-
ization, the interface between ODA and private capital flows, and the
production and distribution of goods and services. It is clear from a peru-
101. This tactic has often been raised in relation to allegations of human rights abuse by
such bodies as Transparency International. See Gutto, supra note 82; Udombana,
supra note 92, at 1180.
102. Communique Issued at the end of the Seventh Summit of the Heads of State and
Government Implementation Committee of the NEPAD (May 28, 2003), available
at http://www.nigeriahighcommottawa.com/7hsgic.htm.
103. NEPAD, supra note 2, 1.
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sal of NEPAD that there remain many unanswered questions in relation
to these issues including the reality of the expectation of increased ODA
in the face of current trends towards its reduction; the important issues of
domestic resource mobilization including arresting economic spoliation
and inclusion of informal wealth into the formal legal and regulatory
spheres; the development of new markets for African goods and services
both within the continent and outside; and the interface with the WTO.
These concerns must all be addressed within the context of a regional
approach to enhance integration and promote development of the mem-
ber states.
NEPAD, like any other strategy for development and integration, can
only be effective if it is implemented. Implementation and enforcement
of international law instruments has increasingly come under scrutiny. It
matters little that the ideals within an international agreement are power-
ful, in the absence of a proper strategy for the implementation thereof,
the ideals remain lofty principle found only on paper. As highlighted
above, there are several impediments to the implementation of NEPAD.
Some of these relate to the nature of the document itself. These include
its ambiguity in key areas, and the setting of goals, which may not reflect
the existing global and regional economic and political realities. Exam-
ples include the achievement and sustaining of an average GDP above 7
percent per annum and the expectations regarding private capital flows
and ODA. Other impediments relate to the member state approach to
international law. This includes the partial adherence by signatory states,
the use of the concept of sovereignty as a shield to avoid perceived inter-
ference with internal matters and the penchant for consensus within Afri-
can states. These may prove a hindrance to the implementation of
NEPAD. Through the APRM procedure, some of these issues can be
effectively addressed because the APRM includes, by its very nature, the
waiver of absolute sovereignty of the member to provide for APRM im-
plementation of the mechanism at a national level.
This research of NEPAD is by no means conclusive. There exist a
number of areas where further research would prove valuable. In partic-
ular, the issues of implementation and enforcement of this and other soft
law instruments in Africa, the operation of the APRM, and the use of
tools such as peer review mechanisms to influence the implementation of
regional attempts at economic development, regulation, and regional in-
tegration deserve further exploration.
It is clear that Africa is in dire need of a program for economic recov-
ery. The political mindset exists among the present leaders to translate
the ideals of NEPAD into concrete strategies for implementation. By
drawing on past experiences within and outside the continent, and
through a process of inclusion of the various stakeholders in Africa,
NEPAD can, if implemented properly, serve as a powerful tool for eco-
nomic development and regional integration for the benefit of the people
who matter the most -Africans.
